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While most of the capital budgeting situations are typically micro level problems, the introduction 
of this dual impact of the corporate tax rate on the project acceptance criterion provides an 
insight into potential tax regime decisions on long term investments in a given tax jurisdiction.  If 
we understand this dual behavior well enough, it might be possible for a tax regime to manipulate 
its corporate tax rate without necessarily jeopardizing acceptability status of capital projects to 
providers of capital. The present paper is an attempt to model this dual impact of the corporate 
tax rate on the NPV of projects within the tax regime, and study the implications of the results for 





he issue of allocation of scarce resources to long term investment decisions,  often called Capital 
Budgeting in brief,  is a very important research and pedagogical topic in Corporate Financial 
Management [Brigham et al, Bierman and Smidt, Levy and Sarnat,  and Seitz and Ellison, among 
others].  The basic methodology of this allocation process is the time tested Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach, 
where the Net Present Value (NPV) of the potential investment project is estimated by using a methodology that is 
standard in all corporate finance textbooks.  In this typical approach, as we all know, the net after tax cash flows to 
the project is discounted at the weighted average cost of capital appropriate for the project in question. 
 
The impact of corporate taxes on the project NPV is usually twofold.  The corporate tax rate (statutory rate, 
barring various actual adjustments) affects the after tax cash flow to the project.  As this tax rate goes up, the after 
tax cash flow for a given before tax amount, goes down.  However, the corporate tax rate also affects the weighted 
average cost of capital when the company uses debt capital in its capital structure. For, unlike costs of equity, the 
after tax cost of debt, (the after tax cost is the one that impacts the project or the corporate weighted average cost of 
capital) goes down as the tax rate is increased for a given before tax cost of debt.  The before tax cost of debt 
typically is driven by either the capital market, or, in some cases, set by financial institutions and is not directly 
affected by tax issues.  As the weighted average cost of capital is used to discount the after tax cash flows from the 
project, from a mathematical point of view, it goes into the denominator of the NPV equation.  The after tax cash 
flow itself, however, goes into the numerator of the equation.   A change in the corporate tax rate in a tax regime, 
therefore, has, ceteris paribus, two effects on the NPV.  The effect on the cash flow is a direct effect, where the 
movement of the NPV is in the opposite direction as that of the tax rate, i.e. the higher the tax rate the lower the 
NPV.  The effect on the weighted average cost of capital is also an inverse effect; thus the movement of NPV is now 
in the same direction as the tax rate since NPV increases with lower discount rates.  This non linear two sided 
interaction between the project NPV and the statutory corporate tax rate could give rise to a potential trade off 
between the tax rate and the project acceptance criterion. 
 
While most of the capital budgeting situations are typically micro level problems, the introduction of this 
dual impact of the corporate tax rate on the project acceptance criterion provides an insight into potential tax regime 
decisions on long term investments in a given tax jurisdiction.  If we understand this dual behavior well enough, it 
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might be possible for a tax regime to manipulate its corporate tax rate without necessarily jeopardizing acceptability 
status of capital projects to providers of capital. 
 
The present paper is an attempt to model this dual impact of the corporate tax rate on the NPV of projects 
within the tax regime, and study the implications of the results for policy makers and for corporations facing such 
policy makers. 
 
An unstable tax environment in third world nations is a complicating factor in the decision process of 
multinational corporations. A change in the marginal corporate tax rate can effect both the cash flow from a capital 
project and the cost of capital used as the discount rate for the net cash flows of the project. In a previous paper Basu 
et al [1] provided a mathematical sensitivity analysis based on a continuous time NPV model. In this paper we shall 
extend their analysis of how this result can be used by the host government to  develop a flexible tax policy that is 




The critical value of the derivative of the cost of capital with respect to the marginal corporate tax rate is 
that value at which both the net present value of the project as well as the derivative of the net present value with  
respect to the marginal corporate tax rate are both zero. At that critical value the investment decision is unaffected 
by tax rate increases or decreases since the net present value of zero is in fact a local minimum or maximum unless 
the second derivative were zero, which could only happen in isolated situations. 
 
The crucial mathematical result derived by Basu et al in his previous paper was the formula (1) given 
below that  expresses the critical value of the derivative of the cost of capital with respect to the marginal corporate 
tax rate as a function of three parameters: n, the life of the investment, k the cost of capital and T, the marginal 
corporate tax rate. 
 
This formula was derived by equating dNPV/dT to zero at the point where NPV = 0, "when the investment 
decision will be unaffected by changes in tax rates T. The magnitude of dk/dT for which we can obtain such 
conditions will give us a range of indifference. This is the critical value for dk/dT at which tax rate changes have no 
impact on the investment decision." 
 
dk/dT = a * (1 + a/(n*k))/ (T-1) * (a/k + n*(a+1))    (1) 
 
where a = exp(-k * n) -1 and  the standard operation priorities apply. 
 
We have explicitly computed dk/dT from equation (1) for values of n, the life of the investment that vary 
from 5 to 10 years, k the cost of capital that varies from 5% to 15% and T, the marginal corporate tax rate that is 
either 30% or 40% or 50%. The crucial observation from a close examination of this table is that the values of dk/dt 
are always negative and that its absolute value is for fixed n and T an increasing function of k; this can be verified 
by computing the derivative of (1) with respect to k. The fact that dk/dT is negative is a positive incentive for the 
multinational corporation to undertake the investment even in an environment of increasing marginal corporate 
taxation by the host government because the decreased cash inflows due to tax rate increases are countered by a 
decrease in the cost of capital at which these cash flows are discounted. Moreover, the higher the cost of capital is 
initially, the greater this decrease in the cost of capital for the same increase in the marginal corporate tax rate 
because of the increase in the absolute value of dk/dT as a function of k. 
 
This leads to a surprising and counter-intuitive optimal strategy by the host government. If the initial cost 
of capital is high, a moderate increase in the marginal corporate tax rate will lead to a substantial decrease in the cost 
of capital in the region of NPV = dNPV/dT = 0 and therefore not adversely influence the decision mechanism of the 
multinational corporation considering the investment. 
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Years N Cost Of Cap K Tax Rate T Num Den Z = Solution 
5 0.05 0.4 -0.025482843 0.317988254 -0.080137685 
5 0.06 0.4 -0.035264464 0.369363131 -0.095473697 
5 0.07 0.4 -0.046142984 0.417180676 -0.110606714 
5 0.08 0.4 -0.057957774 0.461639517 -0.125547688 
5 0.09 0.4 -0.070564389 0.502927868 -0.140307177 
5 0.1 0.4 -0.083833097 0.541224063 -0.154895361 
5 0.11 0.4 -0.09764753 0.576697058 -0.169322053 
5 0.12 0.4 -0.111903464 0.609506911 -0.183596711 
5 0.13 0.4 -0.126507701 0.639805239 -0.197728454 
5 0.14 0.4 -0.141377044 0.667735644 -0.211726071 
5 0.15 0.4 -0.156437374 0.693434131 -0.225598031 
5 0.16 0.4 -0.171622799 0.717029492 -0.239352496 
5 0.17 0.4 -0.18687488 0.73864368 -0.252997331 
5 0.18 0.4 -0.202141931 0.758392155 -0.266540113 
5 0.19 0.4 -0.217378374 0.776384224 -0.279988139 
5 0.2 0.4 -0.232544158 0.792723353 -0.293348439 
10 0.05 0.4 -0.083833097 1.082448125 -0.077447681 
10 0.06 0.4 -0.111903464 1.219013822 -0.091798356 
10 0.07 0.4 -0.141377044 1.335471288 -0.105863035 
10 0.08 0.4 -0.171622799 1.434058984 -0.119676248 
10 0.09 0.4 -0.202141931 1.51678431 -0.133270056 
10 0.1 0.4 -0.232544158 1.585446706 -0.146674219 
10 0.11 0.4 -0.262528015 1.641658496 -0.159916338 
10 0.12 0.4 -0.291864514 1.686863669 -0.173021993 
10 0.13 0.4 -0.320383598 1.722354812 -0.186014865 
10 0.14 0.4 -0.34796294 1.749288371 -0.198916854 
10 0.15 0.4 -0.374518674 1.768698399 -0.211748184 
10 0.16 0.4 -0.399997752 1.78150895 -0.224527501 
10 0.17 0.4 -0.42437164 1.788545241 -0.237271963 
10 0.18 0.4 -0.447631142 1.79054371 -0.249997327 
10 0.19 0.4 -0.469782153 1.788161066 -0.26271803 
10 0.2 0.4 -0.490842181 1.781982451 -0.275447258 
10 0.05 0.5 -0.083833097 0.902040104 -0.092937217 
10 0.06 0.5 -0.111903464 1.015844852 -0.110158027 
10 0.07 0.5 -0.141377044 1.11289274 -0.127035643 
10 0.08 0.5 -0.171622799 1.195049154 -0.143611498 
10 0.09 0.5 -0.202141931 1.263986925 -0.159924068 
10 0.1 0.5 -0.232544158 1.321205588 -0.176009063 
10 0.11 0.5 -0.262528015 1.368048747 -0.191899606 
10 0.12 0.5 -0.291864514 1.405719724 -0.207626391 
10 0.13 0.5 -0.320383598 1.435295677 -0.223217838 
10 0.14 0.5 -0.34796294 1.457740309 -0.238700225 
10 0.15 0.5 -0.374518674 1.473915332 -0.254097821 
10 0.16 0.5 -0.399997752 1.484590791 -0.269433001 
10 0.17 0.5 -0.42437164 1.490454368 -0.284726355 
10 0.18 0.5 -0.447631142 1.492119758 -0.299996793 
10 0.19 0.5 -0.469782153 1.490134222 -0.315261636 
10 0.2 0.5 -0.490842181 1.484985376 -0.33053671 
15 0.05 0.5 -0.156437374 1.733585327 -0.090239212 
15 0.06 0.5 -0.202141931 1.895980387 -0.106616045 
15 0.07 0.5 -0.247604222 2.018768674 -0.122651112 
15 0.08 0.5 -0.291864514 2.108579586 -0.138417594 
15 0.09 0.5 -0.334296783 2.17102993 -0.153980734 
15 0.1 0.5 -0.374518674 2.210872998 -0.169398547 
15 0.11 0.5 -0.412323819 2.232126101 -0.184722457 
15 0.12 0.5 -0.447631142 2.238179637 -0.199997862 
15 0.13 0.5 -0.480447073 2.231890342 -0.215264641 
15 0.14 0.5 -0.510837514 2.215660973 -0.230557617 
15 0.15 0.5 -0.538907199 2.191508401 -0.245906974 
15 0.16 0.5 -0.564784613 2.161121746 -0.261338638 
15 0.17 0.5 -0.588611113 2.125912017 -0.276874634 
15 0.18 0.5 -0.61053317 2.087054452 -0.292533417 
15 0.19 0.5 -0.630696969 2.045524644 -0.308330174 
15 0.2 0.5 -0.649244726 2.002129316 -0.324277119 
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From our tabulated values it also seems that the absolute value of dk/dT is for fixed k and T a decreasing 
function of n; this means that for projects with a longer life the magnitude of the decrease in the cost of capital as the 




Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have significantly different marginal effective tax rates on cost of production 
for foreign firms in the tourism industry. They are respectively 30%, 17% and 7%  (International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper, 2000 p. 22). Currently the cost of capital, usually a weighted average of debt, preferred stock and 
equity capital, in these three nations is approximately 18% (The Monitor Kampala, Nov 13, 2006  p. 2). From 
equation (1) we find the respective values of the derivative of the cost of capital with respect to the marginal 
corporate tax rate to be equal to -.228, -.193 and -.172. On the surface it would appear that Uganda would be the 
least attractive nation for investment because of the significantly higher tax rate. But Uganda does have an 
advantage in respect to reducing the cost of capital by increasing the effective marginal tax rate. A 5% increase in  
its marginal tax rate from 30% to 35% will in fact decrease the cost of capital by over 1% (5*.228 = 1.14% to be 
exact). A similar 5% increase in the marginal tax rate of Tanzania from 17% to 22% will decrease the cost of capital 
by a little under 1% (5*.193 = 0.96% to be exact). A similar 5% increase in the marginal tax rate of Kenya from 7% 
to 12% will decrease the cost of capital by only about 0.85% (5*.172 = 0.86% to be exact). This result is counter to 
conventional wisdom which would dictate that an increase of the already high marginal tax rate by Uganda would be 




In this paper we have extended the mathematical analysis of Basu et al to demonstrate how their result can 
be used by the host government to  develop a flexible tax policy in an unstable corporate tax environment that is still 
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